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1 
Introduction 
This Annex reviews “alternative” policy instruments used by emerging market central banks 
to deal with the effects of external factors on their domestic financial systems. The term 
“alternative” here means policy instruments other than standard tools such as interest rates 
or foreign exchange market intervention.  
We group these alternative instruments into three broad categories: first, alternative 
monetary policy and macroprudential tools aimed at offsetting the financial implications of 
capital flows; second, balance sheet policies other than foreign exchange intervention; and 
third, fiscal and quasi-fiscal measures to offset the domestic consequences of foreign 
exchange intervention. The analysis is based on information provided by the central banks in 
response to a BIS questionnaire prepared for this meeting. The time horizon for policy 
measures is 2008–11. 
The rationale for the use of alternative central bank policy instruments in emerging markets is 
fairly straightforward. Most central banks have a broad mandate that includes not only price 
(or exchange rate) stability, but also the safeguarding of financial stability, as well as the 
promotion of economic growth, and, sometimes, financial development. To fulfil these 
multiple objectives within the constraints imposed by a particular policy regime – inflation 
targeting, fixed exchange rate or a managed float – central banks use all available tools, 
including cooperation in some instances with fiscal authorities and other policymakers. This 
does not imply that monetary and fiscal policymakers do not normally cooperate; rather, 
there are occasions where the line between what appears to be distinct responsibilities and 
tasks becomes blurred. Moreover, interest rates and foreign exchange intervention may not 
be sufficient to resolve the policy dilemmas resulting from the impact of external factors on 
the domestic financial system, which are discussed in the BIS notes prepared for this 
meeting. 
Another way to think about alternative central bank policy instruments is in terms of the 
evolution of the central banks’ role, especially since the global financial crisis of 2007–10. 
Over the two decades preceding the crisis, a broad consensus had emerged that price 
stability – a low and stable inflation rate – should be the main, if not exclusive, goal of central 
banks. The consensus further held that the goal of price stability was best served by 
monetary policy focused on one instrument, the policy interest rate. Apart from price stability, 
it was not entirely clear what other roles central banks should play to ensure macroeconomic 
and financial stability.  
During the crisis of 2007–10, however, as conventional monetary easing ran its course and 
approached the zero bound, central banks in a number of countries shifted their focus from 
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prices to quantities (Table 1).
2 These unconventional measures included: liquidity provision 
to banks on extraordinary terms, especially at longer maturities, in order to alleviate 
pressures in the interbank market; intervention in selected credit markets to support 
secondary market liquidity and credit pricing and supply; and outright bond purchases aimed 
at easing financing conditions beyond what could be achieved by policy rate cuts.  
 
Table 1 
Central bank roles and policy tools 
Conventional  Monetary policy tools  Prudential policy tools 
Focus on prices 
Indirect approach to influencing 
financial conditions and asset 
prices 
Direct influence on the very 
short-term interbank market only 




Central bank balance sheet tools  Unconventional 
Intervention in domestic 
financial markets 
Intervention in FX markets 
Focus shifted from prices to 
quantities 
Direct intervention in financial 
markets 
Term interbank market 
Sovereign bond markets 
Credit markets (corporate and 




Currency swap arrangements 
Source: Hannoun (2010).  
 
As a result, central banks’ balance sheets in advanced economies have expanded 
significantly, with a notable lengthening of asset duration. In the emerging market 
economies, the size of central banks’ balance sheets had already expanded considerably 
before the crisis, as many central banks had built up foreign reserves in what might be 
considered a long-standing form of unconventional policies. As market and macroeconomic 
conditions stabilised and improved over the course of 2009–10, central banks began to wind 
down these unconventional measures and to prepare for the return to conventional policy 
mode. 
Since the start of the crisis in 2007, the prevailing view on the role of central banks has thus 
shifted from the relatively narrow focus on price stability to a view that central banks can and 
often should maintain a key presence in the financial system. Against this background, the 
following tables in this Annex provide a summary list (which is not necessarily exhaustive) of 
various measures used by central banks in major EMEs to deal with effects of external 
factors on their domestic financial systems over the past three years.  
                                                  
2   See H Hannoun, “The expanding role of central banks since the crisis: what are the limits?” Speech at the 
Conference on the 150th Anniversary of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 18 June 2010. 





Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Changes in reserve requirements  
Brazil (3 December 2010): Reserve requirements on 
time deposits increased from 15% to 20%.  
 
Colombia (7 May 2007): Imposing marginal reserve 
requirements on local currency checking accounts, 
savings accounts and CDs, and a reserve requirement 
on foreign indebtedness. Shortly after, the finance 
ministry imposed a similar requirement on portfolio 
inflows. 
(June 2008): Central bank decided to eliminate marginal 
reserve requirements from September 2008 on and to 
raise ordinary reserve requirements (which were then 
cut on 24 October 2008). 
Aimed at mitigating the exchange rate 
appreciation; cooling credit growth and 
private indebtedness; and accelerating the 
transmission of policy interest rate hikes.  
The measures led to a shift in the 
composition of inflows (fewer short-term 
speculative inflows) and strengthened the 
transmission of policy rate movements. 
Hungary (October 2008): Reserve requirement ratio 
lowered from 5% to 2%. 
(November 2010): flexible reserve requirements (2–5%) 
are available for banks depending on their needs. 
 
India: Between 26 December 2006 and 10 October 
2008 the cash reserve ratio was gradually increased 
from 5% to 9%. Between 13 October 2008 and 
19 January 2009, the ratio was cut in several steps back 
to 5%, and stayed at that level until 12 February 2010. It 
was subsequently raised in three steps back to 6%. 
Sterilisation of the domestic liquidity 
implications of capital inflows. 
Peru (31 January 2008): Central bank raised its reserve 
requirements on deposits in domestic and foreign 
currency, from 6% to 25% and from 30% to 49%, 
respectively. Reserve requirement ratio for non-resident 
deposits was set at 120%; and for external borrowing of 
banks to 49%. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
reserve requirements were lowered to levels observed 
before the start of the crisis.  
(June 2010): Central bank raised legal minimum reserve 
requirement (from 6% to 9%); reserve requirements on 
deposits in local and foreign currency (from 6% to 25%, 
and from 30% to 55%, respectively); requirements on 
non-resident deposits (from 35% to 120%), and 
requirements on external short-term borrowings of banks 
(from 35% to 75%). 
Discourage short-term capital inflows and 
external borrowing, as well as rapid growth 
of domestic credit. 
The measures helped to moderate the high 
growth rates of credit in soles and dollars, 
thereby controlling domestic demand and its 
impact on inflation. The actions during the 
first stage of the recent crisis helped to 
improve the level of international liquidity of 
the economy and provided greater flexibility 
to confront any reversal of capital flows. 
Poland (mid-2009): Reserve requirement ratio was 
lowered from 3.5% to 3%. 




Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Changes in reserve requirements  
Russia (15 January–17 September 2008): Required 
reserve ratio on credit institutions’ liabilities to non-
resident banks in local and foreign currencies was 
gradually raised from 3.5% to 8.5%; required reserve 
ratio on liabilities to individuals and on credit institutions’ 
other liabilities raised from 3% to 5.5%, and from 3.5% 
to 6%, respectively.  
(18 September 2008–30 April 2009): All required reserve 
ratios were gradually cut to 0.5%.  
(Since May 1, 2009): Required reserve ratios were again 
gradually raised, with the most recent increase on 
1 February 2011 (increase in reserve requirements on 
non-resident companies to 3.5% from 2.5%, and of other 
reserve requirements by 50 basis points to 3.0%). 
 
Saudi Arabia (2007–09): Changes in the required 
reserve requirements. 
Contain the rapid growth of bank credit. 
Turkey (2010): Any debt contracted by offshore 
branches of the Turkish banks made subject to reserve 
requirements. 
Eliminate advantage of foreign borrowing by 
offshore branches of Turkish banks. 
Turkey (November 2008–April 2010): In November 
2008, reserve requirements on deposits in foreign 
currency were reduced from 11% to 9%. In October 
2009, reserve requirements for deposits in local 
currency were reduced from 6% to 5%. 
(April 2010–July 2011): In April–November 2010, 
reserve requirements on deposits in domestic and 
foreign currencies were gradually raised back to 6% and 
11%, respectively. The increases in reserve 
requirements continued in January–July 2011, as 
reserve requirements on deposits in domestic currency 
were gradually raised to 16% on demand deposits, 
notice deposits, private current accounts and 
deposits/participation accounts with maturity up to one 
month; to 13% on deposits and participation accounts 
with maturity up to three months and liabilities other than 
deposits; to 9% on deposits and participation accounts 
with maturity up to six months. At the same time, reserve 
requirements on local currency deposits and 
participation accounts with one-year or longer maturities 
were cut to 5%. In April 2011, reserve requirements on 
short-term (up to one year) FX deposits and other short-
term FX liabilities were raised to 12% and on other FX 
liabilities with maturity 1–3 years, to 11.5%.  
(July 2011): reserve requirements on FX deposits with 
one year or longer maturity and other FX liabilities with 
1–3 years maturity were cut to 10%, and to 9% on other 




Lowering credit growth in the light of capital 




Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Real estate market measures / Limits on credit growth 
Brazil (20 October 2009): 2% tax on capital inflows to 
equities and fixed income public securities issued 
domestically  
(October 2010): Tax on fixed income instruments issued 
domestically raised to 6%.  
The 6% tax on fixed income securities had a 
significant impact: from January–October 
2010, net inflow was $14.8 billion; from 
November–December, there was a net 
outflow of $0.2 billion.  
China (April 2010): Lowered LTV ceiling from 80% to 
70% for the first home buyers of apartments over 90 m
2, 
lowered the LTV ceiling to 50% and set the minimum 
mortgage rate at 110% of the base rate for second home 
buyers; in certain areas, suspended mortgages on third 
homes and mortgage loans to non-local residents. 
(September 2010): Suspended all mortgages on third 
homes and mortgage loans to non-local residents; 
lowered the LTV ceiling to 70% for all first home buyers.
(January 2011): For mortgages of second homes, 
lowered the LTV cap to 40% and set the minimum 
mortgage rate at 110% of the benchmark rate. 
 
Hong Kong SAR (23 October 2009): Lowered LTV 
ceiling for residential mortgages on properties valued at 
HKD 20 million or more, from 70% to 60%. 
Reminded authorised institutions that they should be 
prudent in valuing properties and calculating borrowers’ 
debt-servicing ratios. 
To ensure banks properly manage their 
mortgage lending-related risks and to 
maintain stability of the banking system.  
As a result, number and value of new 
mortgage loans approved in November 2009 
dropped by 25% and 23%, respectively, 
from September 2009. Market optimism 
tempered in Q4 2009 as investors were 
more mindful of the risk of asset bubbles. 
Hong Kong SAR (13 August 2010): Applying a 
maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 60% to properties 
with a value at or above HKD 12 million. For properties 
valued below HKD 12 million, the 70% LTV guideline 
continues to apply, but the maximum loan amount is 
capped at HKD 7.2 million. 
Lowering the maximum LTV ratio for properties which 
are not intended to be occupied by the owners to 60%. 
Banks should require mortgage applicants to declare 
whether they intend to occupy the mortgaged property. 
Standardising the limit on debt servicing ratios (DSRs) of 
mortgage applicants to 50% instead of the current range 
of 50–60%. In addition, banks should stress-test 
mortgage applicants’ repayment ability, assuming an 
increase in mortgage rates of at least 2 percentage 
points, and limit the stressed DSR to a cap of 60%. 
Managing risks to the stability of the banking 
system, as well as safety and soundness of 
individual institutions. These risks were 
prevailing as a result of rising property prices 
and buoyant investment sentiment due to 
the unusually low interest rate environment. 
As a result of the continued rise in property 
prices, various indicators gauging housing 
affordability were rising.  




Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Real estate market measures / Limits on credit growth 
Hong Kong SAR (November 2010): Lowered the 
LTV ceiling to 50% for flats over HKD 12 million and 
non-owner occupied properties; to 60% (with cap of 
HKD 6 million) for flats in the range of  
HKD 8–12 million; and to 70% with cap of 
HKD 4.8 million for flats below HKD 8 million. 
 
India (November 2010): Introduced a LTV ceiling of 
80% and increased risk weights for mortgage loans 
over INR 7.5 million to 125%. 
 
Korea (2009): Ceiling on LTV ratios lowered in the 
Seoul region from 60% to 50% for bank housing loans 
of less than 10 years (July 2009), and for non-bank 
housing loans (October 2009). Debt-to-income ceilings, 
which had applied only to speculative zones, were 
extended to all of Seoul.  
(August 2010): Eased the debt-to-income restrictions 
for mortgage loans to low-income earners who buy 
homes for own occupancy.  
 
Malaysia (November 2010): Lowered the LTV ceiling to 
70% for third mortgages. 
 
Poland (February 2010, effective December 2010): 
Recommendation on good practice regarding risk 
management of retail credit exposures. The payment-to-
income ratio may not exceed 50% for borrowers earning 
less than the average national wage, or 65% for other 
borrowers. For FX-denominated loans to unhedged 
borrowers, the calculation of the payment-to-income ratio 
has to assume, in addition, a 10% depreciation of the 
zloty (20% for loans of maturity above five years).  
The aim is to strengthen risk management 
practices in the area of retail (household) 
exposures.  
Too early to assess the impact of the 
recommendation, but regular NBP surveys 
indicate that banks have tightened their 
lending policy in response to the 
recommendation.  




Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Real estate market measures / Limits on credit growth 
Singapore (September 2009): Interest-only loans and 
loans in which the developer absorbed interest on behalf 
of the borrower for a period of time disallowed.  
(February 2010): LTV ceiling for housing loans extended 
by financial institutions was lowered from 90% to 80%. 
Seller’s stamp duty (SDD) on all residential properties 
bought and sold within one year was introduced.  
(August 2010): the hold period of the imposition of SDD 
increased from one year to three years. The minimum 
cash down-payment for housing raised from 5% to 10%. 
LTV ratio for borrowers seeking to purchase property 
and who already have one or more outstanding housing 
loans lowered from 80% to 70%. The minimum period 
for which a person must occupy his public housing unit 
before he can sublet or resell the unit was raised. 
Concurrent ownership of public housing and private 
properties during minimum occupation period was 
disallowed.  
(January 2011): LTV ceiling was lowered from 60% to 
50% for property buyers who are not individuals and 
from 70% to 60% for individuals with one or more 
outstanding housing loans. 
To temper effervescence in property sector. 
Thailand (November 2010): Setting an LTV ceiling of 
95% for low-rise residential properties and 90% for 
condominium units below THB 10 million. If the cap is 
breached, the risk weight for mortgage loans increased 
from 35% to 75%. 
 
Turkey (2007): Setting maximum LTV ratio of 75% on 
residential mortgages and 50% on commercial property; 
introducing adjustable rate mortgages. 
 
Limits to FX exposure 
Brazil (6 January 2011): Limiting financial institutions’ 
FX short position in the spot market to $3 billion or the 
bank regulatory capital (whichever is lower). 60% of the 
excess amount must be deposited, in domestic 
currency, at central bank without remuneration.  
With a transition period of 90 days, the 
measure took effect at the start of April 
2011. Aimed at preventing excessive 
currency appreciation.  
Colombia (7 May 2007): Central bank restricted the size 
of the gross FX derivatives exposure of domestic 
financial institutions at 500% of technical capital. 
Mitigating counterparty risk in FX derivatives 
markets. 




Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Limits to FX exposure 
Hungary (2008): Moral suasion by the National Bank of 
Hungary and the Hungarian Financial Supervisory 
Authority to steer banks and consumers away from FX-
denominated loans, especially from JPY loans. 
(Beginning of 2010): LTV regulation differentiating HUF- 
and FX-denominated loans, and payment-to-income limit 
for FX-denominated loans in relation to HUF loans. The 
highest possible rates for HUF, then for EUR and the 
lowest for the other FX loans. 
(August 2010): FX-denominated mortgage lending was 
banned by the new government. 
In 2010, the proportion of HUF-denominated 
loans in new loan volumes increased 
considerably; total volume of new loans did 
not decrease. 
Korea: (June 2010): Ceilings on FX forward positions 
relative to banks’ equity capital; tighter management of 
foreign currency lending; and stronger management of 
FX soundness. The ceilings were set and applied as 
50% of previous month’s capital for domestic banks, and 
250% for foreign bank branches. 
Reducing systemic risk related to excessive 
volatility of capital flows. Curb excessive 
short-term overseas borrowings.  
As a result, growth in short-term foreign 
borrowing has slowed since June. 
Philippines (October 2010): Increasing foreign 
exchange transaction ceilings for over-the-counter FX 
purchases by residents for non-trade current account 
purposes; to cover advance payment requirements; for 
outward investments and/or investments in Philippine 
debt papers issued offshore; and for currency 
reconversion by non-resident tourists at ports of exit. 
Increase flexibility in managing FX 
exposures and facilitate foreign investment 
payments. 
Poland (13 March 2007, effective 1 April 2007, but 
banks had the option not to apply new rules until 31 
December 2007): Higher risk weights for FX mortgages. 
If the currency of a loan is different from the currency of 
borrower’s income, a 75% risk weight was applied to the 
“fully and completely” secured part of exposure secured 
by borrower-occupied residential property (35% risk 
weight if the currency of exposure is the same as the 
currency of borrower’s income). 
(2009): early warnings were given on FX lending. 
(2010): moral suasion was used to stop banks lending 
JPY-denominated mortgages. 
Difficult to judge the impact because the 
time span of the influence of the higher risk 
weight in an undisturbed environment was 
quite short: new FX mortgage lending 
declined strongly starting in Q4 2008 due to 
the market turmoil, exchange rate 
depreciation and higher costs of hedging FX 
positions. 
Elements of dynamic provisioning 
Colombia (2008): Financial Superintendency 
established a provisioning system for commercial loans 
with countercyclical features, and decided to increase 
provisioning requirements on consumer loans in 
anticipation of the implementation of a similar system for 
consumer lending. 
 





Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Elements of dynamic provisioning 
India (October 2009): Higher risk weights and 
provisioning requirements on bank loans to specific 
sector such as commercial estate and exposure to the 
capital market. 
 
Israel (July 2010): Bank supervisor published new 
guidelines on the development of housing loan risks, 
which require banking corporations to examine their 
housing credit risk management and make additional 
provisions for housing loans with high loan-to-value 
ratios.  
 
Peru (November 2008): Supervisor of banking, 
insurance and pension funds established a pro-cyclical 
provisioning scheme that accumulates additional 
provisions during the expansionary stage of the 




Colombia: Minimum stay requirement on foreign direct 
investments of two years. 
 
Czech Republic (until September 2008): Improving 
credit risk analysis and data collection. 
 
Hungary (until September 2008): The supervisors 
required some banks to strengthen risk management. 
Moratorium on mortgage foreclosures starting in late 
2009 and set to expire in April 2011. 
Banning foreclosures of FX mortgages originated after July 
2010. 
 
Philippines (October 2010): Allow private sector to 
prepay foreign currency loans without prior BSP 
approval; banks allowed to act on foreign investors’ 
requests for FX conversion and outward remittance of 
peso funds. 
Increase flexibility in managing FX 
exposures and facilitate foreign investment 
payments. 
Peru (2009): Ban on foreign investors’ purchases of 
central bank bills. 
(2010): Increased fee on foreign purchases of central 
bank liquidity draining instruments, to 400 basis points. 
Restricting foreign investors’ access to 
central bank instruments. 
Poland (end-2008–beginning of 2009): The authorities 
convinced most banks to retain 2008 profits.  
(2009–10): The financial supervisors allowed banks to 
count some convertible and long-term bonds as own 
capital for two years. 





Table 1A (cont) 
Alternative monetary policy and macroprudential tools 
to offset the implications of heavy capital inflows 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Other measures 
Turkey (2008): Removing obstacles on domestic foreign 
currency loans. 
Shifting a portion of external debt to Turkey 
and hence preventing exaggeration of 
external debt shock.  
Shift in foreign currency borrowing from 
Turkish banks’ foreign branches or affiliates 
to borrowing from domestic banks.  
Turkey (2007): Banks were instructed to target 12% 
capital adequacy ratios.  
(2008–09): Banks needed approval before distributing 
2008 profits, renewed for 2009 profits and later; banks 
with capital adequacy ratios above 16% were to lower 
general provisioning until March 2011; banks allowed to 
reclassify non-performing loans to performing if slippage 
was related to liquidity crunch; and banks could also 
reclassify government bonds from available-to-sale to 
hold-to-maturity. 
 
1 Preliminary assessment. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire; IMF; national sources. 





Balance sheet policies other than foreign exchange intervention 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Intervention in domestic financial market 
Hungary (October 2008): FX swap tenders for 
domestic banks, backed by agreements with the ECB 
and the Swiss National Bank.  
Broadening the range of eligible collateral and reducing 
the reserve ratio from 5% to 2%.  
Reinforcing financial markets and the FX 
liquidity of the banking sector.  
Collateralised loans with longer maturities 
supported banks’ HUF liquidity 
management and thereby reduced the 
volatility of HUF interbank rates. 
India (2008): Greater access to the central bank repo 
facility. Introduction of 14-day term collateralised repo 
facility for banks, non-banks, housing finance 
companies and mutual funds. 
(2009–10): Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) 
securities were unwound to inject domestic liquidity. 
Enhancing the availability of domestic 
liquidity during crisis. 
Managing the impact of capital inflows 
(MSS securities were issued to absorb 
surplus liquidity from capital inflows). 
Korea (October 2008): financial market stabilisation 
measures, including provision of liquidity to the market 
through long-term and non-regular repo purchases 
one-off interest payments on bank reserve 
requirements; and contributions to the Bank 
Recapitalisation Fund, the Bond Market Stabilisation 
fund, and the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund.  
Provision of foreign currency liquidity to financial 
institutions via a swap facility using the official reserves 
and a swap facility with the Federal Reserve. 
The measures have contributed to the 
stabilisation of the financial markets during 
the crisis. 
Mexico: Interest rate swap auction programme for up 
to MXN 50 billion for domestic financial institutions. 
Banco de Mexico offered the floating rate (the 28-day 
interbank equilibrium rate) in exchange for a fixed rate. 
Reduce sensitivity of banks’ portfolios to 
fluctuations in the yield curve. Actual use of 
this measure was limited: less than 10% of 
the total amount originally considered was 
allocated.  
Peru (October 2008): Extending maturity term of the 
liquidity provision to the financial system and easing 
reserve requirement ratios. Impact of the full range of 
instruments deployed (repo, central bank certificates, 
central bank swaps and reserve requirements) on 
credit supply over October 2008–March 2009 
estimated at 9.6% of GDP. 
Repurchase of central bank certificates. 
Prevent credit crunch caused by over-
reactions of banks to the non-renewal of 
foreign credit lines, or to deterioration of the 
quality of the loan portfolio. 
Preserve market liquidity of the system; 
maintain collateral value of the assets for 
money market operations; set a benchmark 
for longer-term lending operations. 
Poland (October 2008): Providing liquidity in domestic 
currency in the form of repo transactions; providing 
liquidity in foreign currency through seven-day and 
one-month FX swap transactions; earlier redemption of 
central bank’s bonds; lowering the required reserve 
rate from 3% to 3.5%.  
Prompt and appropriate response of the 
NBP helped to restore confidence on the 
interbank market. The new set of 
operations reduced liquidity risk in banks. It 
has led to the resumption of bilateral 
quotations on the interbank repo market for 
transactions longer than overnight.  




Table 1B (cont) 
Balance sheet policies other than foreign exchange intervention 
Policy tools  Objectives / effects
1 
Intervention in domestic financial market 
Philippines (October–November 2008): Establishment 
of a US dollar repurchase agreement facility. 
Dollar swap transactions to sterilise BSP’s participation 
in the foreign exchange market. 
 
Increase dollar liquidity in the foreign 
exchange market. 
BSP’s dollar forward transactions allowed 
banks to increase their foreign assets and 
limit their foreign currency exposure. 
Turkey (19 June 2009–15 October 2010): Maturity of 
daily repo tenders increased to three months maturity. 
Mitigating stress on one-week repo auction 
and money market interest rates.  
Purchases of bonds issued by government 
Hungary (October–December 2008): Secondary 
market purchases of the Hungarian government 
securities. 
Provided HUF liquidity to the banking 
system and improved the secondary market 
liquidity by supporting market-making by 
primary dealers in the secondary market.  
Israel (February–August 2009): Buying government 
bonds in the secondary market (total of NIS 18 billion).  
Government bond yields were lowered by 
30–40 basis points.  
Mexico (October 2008): Banco de Mexico 
implemented a special programme and acquired MXN 
146 billion of deposit insurance agency (BPA) bonds, 
which are guaranteed by the Federal Government, but 
the guarantee must be ratified every year.  
Purchases of BPAs effectively improved the 
liquidity in the market (many financial 
institutions hold large amounts of these 
BPA bonds).  
(December 2008): Programme to repurchase long-term 
government bonds in the secondary market through 
auctions. 
Improving liquidity in secondary market.  
Intervention in credit market 
Brazil (Q4 2008): FX liquidity provision through loans 
to the private sector. Domestic currency liquidity 
provision through lower reserve requirements. 
Measures mostly reversed in March–December 2010. 
Stimulating the acquisition by large banks of assets 
from small and medium banks.  
Replace supply of trade credit, as 
commercial credit lines were almost 
completely cut off.  
India: Increase in export credit refinance limit for 
commercial banks, and special refinance facilities for 
specialised financial institutions. 
 
Philippines: Liberalisation of rediscounting guidelines.   Enable banks to access additional funds 
that can be re-lent to the public. 
1 Preliminary assessment. 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire; national sources. 





Fiscal policies to offset domestic consequences of foreign exchange interventions 
Policy tools  Objectives 
Higher taxes 
Hong Kong SAR (1 April 2010): Stamp duty rate on 
transactions of property valued over HK$20 million 
raised from 3.75% to 4.25%; no deferral in payment 
of stamp duty allowed. Inland Revenue Department 
closely follows up on property transactions and levies 
tax on the profits arising from property transactions. 
Preventing excessive volatility in property 
prices and stabilising the property market. 
Peru (January 2010): Government imposed a 30% 
tax on foreign investors’ profits from short-term 
currency futures. 
Avoid volatility in the foreign exchange 
market and stabilise the Peruvian currency. 
Thailand (13 October 2010): Revenue Department 
reintroduced 15% withholding tax on foreign 
investments in government and quasi-government 
bonds. 
Restraining speculative inflows into the 
government debt market. 
Reduced deductibility of interest expenses on foreign debt 
Colombia (Q4 2010): Eliminating deductibility of 
interest expenses on foreign debt. 
Reducing attractiveness of external 
borrowing. 
Russia (27 July 2010): Amendments to the Tax 
Code of the Russian Federation, reducing the limit on 
deductibility of interest on foreign currency loans 
(deduction can be taken from the profit tax base for 
the periods of 2011 and 2012; previously 15%, now 
refinancing rate multiplied by the ratio 0.8). At the 
same time, the limit on deductibility for rouble loans 
was raised to 1.8 times refinancing rate (previously 
1.1 8 times refinancing rate). 
Discouraging foreign currency borrowing. 
Interest rate ceilings on external borrowing 
India (December 2009): External commercial 
borrowing under so-called automatic and approval 
routes moderated by reintroducing interest rate 
ceilings. Additional ceiling set imposed on the 
amount of external commercial borrowing under the 
automatic route. 
Increase restrictions on external borrowing 
and prevent high-cost borrowing. 
Prepayment of foreign-denominated debt 
Philippines (2006–2008): National government, 
several government-owned and controlled 
corporations, the BSP, and private corporations 
undertook prepayments of their foreign-denominated 
debt.  
Fiscal borrowing mix leaned towards domestic 
sources. 
 
The prepayments helped mitigate exchange 
rate appreciation pressures and reduce 
significantly the country’s total outstanding 
external debt. 
Taking advantage of a stronger currency as 
well as to limit external debt volatility. The 
share of external borrowings in gross 
borrowings in 2007 was only 27%. 100  BIS Paper No 57
 
 
Table 1C (cont) 
Fiscal policies to offset domestic consequences of foreign exchange interventions 
Policy tools  Objectives 
Other measures 
Singapore (September 2009): More land was 
released by the government for property developers 
to build private properties. 
 
Source: Central bank responses to the BIS questionnaire; national sources. 
 
Sources of information 
Tables 1A–1C in this Annex are based on the following questions from the central bank 
questionnaire prepared by the BIS in August 2010: 
(i)  Which macroprudential tools have proved effective in offsetting the financial 
implications of heavy capital inflows in your jurisdiction (please specify dates)? 
Examples include: dynamic provisioning; countercyclical changes in reserve 
requirements and/or bank capital; changes in loan-to-value, debt-to-income and 
debt service ratios for mortgage and foreign currency loans; reserve requirements 
on external borrowing of banks; limits on credit growth etc.  
(ii)  Which balance sheet policies other than foreign exchange intervention has your 
central bank used in the past? Examples include central bank intervention in 
domestic financial markets such as term interbank market; purchases of bonds 
issued by your government; intervention in credit markets (purchases of domestic 
corporate and covered bonds, asset-backed securities); and intervention in domestic 
mortgage markets.  
(iii)  Which fiscal policy measures have been used in the past few years to offset the 
domestic consequences of forex intervention (please specify dates)? Examples 
include: higher taxes (on stock market and real estate transactions, property, capital 
gains, and capital income); reduced deductibility of interest expenses; expenditure 
measures (lower subsidies for housing or loans to defined groups of borrowers) etc.  
Additional information was collected from central bank websites and other official 
publications. 